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Tournament-Based Incentives and Mergers and Acquisitions 
Abstract 
This research examines the relation between tournament-based incentives, which are proxied by 
the difference between a firm’s CEO pay and the median pay of the senior managers, and mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As). We find that tournament-based incentives are positively related to firm 
acquisitiveness and acquiring firms’ stock and operating performance. Further analysis indicates 
that positive acquisition performance increases the likelihood of the CEO being promoted from 
inside the acquiring firm. Our evidence is consistent with the view that tournament-based 
incentives motivate acquiring firms’ managers to make greater efforts and take more risk that result 
in superior acquisition performance. 
 
JEL classifications: G30, G34 








Managerial compensation plays a crucial role in aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders and has important implications for firm policies and value (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). CEO pay gap, which is the difference in pay between the CEO and his senior executives 
(hereinafter referred to as Vice Presidents or VPs), has attracted increasing attention from 
academic research. Previous studies suggest that CEO pay gap represents the prize of an intra-firm 
CEO tournament that a VP would receive when being promoted to the CEO position of the firm 
(e.g., Gibbs, 1994). Tournament-based incentives can motivate managers to take risk (Kini and 
Williams, 2012) that improves firm performance (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran, 2009). In this 
research, we ask how tournament-based incentives affect firm acquisition activities and acquisition 
performance.  
The tournament incentives theory suggests that executive compensation can provide 
promotion-based (i.e., tournament) incentives. In a company, the CEO is at the top of the 
promotion hierarchy so only performance-based incentives could motivate him to make greater 
efforts. However, both performance-based and promotion-based incentives could be appealing to 
the next group of senior executives (e.g., Green and Stokey, 1983; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 
1988). When a firm runs an intra-firm rank-order tournament, senior executives are typically 
evaluated and ranked by their relative performance because their true abilities are mostly 
unobservable. A senior executive with the highest relative output will be the winner of the CEO 
tournament with the prize being the CEO position. If the likelihood of promotion to the CEO 
position is equal for the VPs, the promotion prize, which is proxied by CEO pay gap, can elicit 
greater efforts (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999, Bognanno, 2001) and risk-taking (Kini 
and Williams, 2012) from the VPs that enhance corporate performance and value (Kale et al., 
2009; Burns, Minnick, and Starks, 2017; Phan, Simpson, and Nguyen, 2017).  
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M&As are an important form of corporate investment. An advantage of using M&As over 
other corporate policies as the testing ground is that the former are observable at their 
announcements, which allows us to capture the direct effects of CEO pay gap on corporate 
behavior and gauge its implication for shareholder value. Numerous studies argue that executive 
compensation affects corporate acquisition decisions and their outcomes (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008); however, to the best of 
our knowledge, no previous research has examined the relation between CEO pay gap and M&As. 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) and Phan (2014) report that M&As increase the default risk of acquiring 
firms. Managers are more likely to lose their jobs for making value-destroying acquisitions (Lehn 
and Zhao, 2006).1 For these reasons, M&As arguably represent the discretionary risk taking of the 
acquiring firms’ managers, which provides a useful setting to examine the relations between 
tournament incentives and corporate policies and performance.  
We begin our analysis by examining the relation between CEO pay gap and M&A 
activities. Using a sample of 19,835 firm-year observations of 2,397 U.S public firms that have 
executive compensation data from 1993–2012, we find that CEO pay gap is positively related to a 
firm’s acquisition likelihood, frequency, and value. Our finding is robust to the correction for 
 
1 We note that Lehn and Zhao (2006) focus on acquirer CEO turnover following the acquisitions. When a CEO is fired 
due to poor acquisition performance, it is reasonable to expect that VPs also bear some consequences, particularly if 
the latter are delegated to make M&A decisions. Therefore, we examine the possibility that VP turnover also increases 
following poor acquisition performance. We calculate the ratio of VPs who are no longer with the acquiring firms 
within the next three or five years following an acquisition. We exclude VPs aged 62 or above from the calculation 
since they would retire from the firm within the testing windows. The results of the regressions of VP turnover ratios 
on acquisition performance and other firm characteristics indicate that poor acquisition performance also leads to 
higher VP turnover rate.  
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potential endogenous relation between CEO pay gap and M&A decisions. Our evidence indicates 
that CEO pay gap is positively associated with managerial risk-taking.  
Next, we investigate the relation between CEO pay gap and shareholder value proxied by 
the acquiring firms’ acquisition announcement abnormal stock returns (CARs). Our cross-
sectional analysis indicates that CEO pay gap is positively related to acquirer CARs. Further 
analysis indicates that CEO pay gap is positively related to the post-acquisition long-term stock 
and operating performance of the acquirers. In a complementary analysis, we find that CEO pay 
gap has more pronounced effects on the stock performance of acquirers with a higher likelihood 
of running CEO tournament. These acquirers are also more likely to engage in focused 
acquisitions. Taken together, our findings suggest positive relations between CEO pay gap and 
corporate risk taking and acquisition performance. 
Our research informs the on-going debate on executive compensation. Large CEO pay 
packages have been a topical issue to the public and academics on the fairness ground. A CEO’s 
large pay could represent the power of a CEO in capturing the pay-setting process (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001) or extracting economic rents and thereby implying a deviation from the 
optimal contracting (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). Alternatively, the high within-firm pay 
disparities can reflect executive compensation incentives. Our evidence suggests that a large pay 
gap between a CEO and the next group of senior executives can induce managers to work harder 
and pursue risk-increasing policies, and its positive relations with corporate performance and value 
are consistent with the efficient contracting argument. Our research also adds to a growing stream 
of literature that investigates the relations between tournament-based incentives and corporate 
policies and firm value. Finally, our findings can help policy makers to make informed decisions 
on policies related to executive compensation and its disclosure. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides literature review and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 details the sample description, variable construction, and 
descriptive statistics. We discuss empirical methods, present results, and provide discussions in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents robustness checks and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. CEO pay gap and M&A activities 
M&As are one of the most important forms of corporate investment. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that M&As can intensify the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that acquirer shareholder announcement 
returns over the period 1980-2001 are positive (1.1%) on average; however, in monetary value,  
acquirers appear to lose about $25 million around the announcement of each acquisition deal, 
which is attributed to the losses incurred by large acquisition deals. Furfine and Rosen (2011) and 
Phan (2014) report that, on average, M&As increase the default risk of acquiring firms. Managers 
may pay a price in the form of their jobs for engaging in value-destroying acquisitions (e.g., Lehn 
and Zhao, 2006). These arguments indicate that M&As represent managers’ discretionary risk-
taking. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue theoretically that executive compensation is a part of 
the internal governance mechanism that can alleviate agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. Previous empirical research documents that managerial equity-based compensation 
(EBC) helps align the interests of managers and shareholders. Boulton, Braga-Alves, and 
Schlingemann (2014) find CEO’s EBC to be positively related to corporate risk taking in M&As 
measured by acquisition likelihood and intensity, whereas Datta et al. (2001) report that managerial 
EBC is positively related to acquirer shareholder value. Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) 
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document a positive relation between CEO vega, a risk-taking incentive measured by CEO wealth 
sensitivity to stock return volatility, and acquisition risk. Although numerous studies have 
examined the relations between different aspects of executive compensation and M&As, no 
previous research has investigated the relation between tournament-based incentives and M&As.  
The tournament incentives theory argues that CEO pay gap can provide promotion-based 
incentives to the VPs. In a company, since the CEO is at the top of the promotion hierarchy, only 
performance-based incentives could elicit greater efforts from the CEO. 2  However, both 
performance-based and promotion-based incentives could be appealing to the VPs (Green and 
Stokey, 1983; Baker et al., 1988). If a firm runs an intra-firm rank-order tournament to select the 
next CEO, VPs are typically evaluated and ranked by their relative performance since their true 
abilities are mostly unobservable. The VP with the highest relative output wins the CEO 
tournament with the prize being the CEO position. If the likelihood of promotion to the CEO 
position is equal for the tournament participants, VPs can improve their chance of success by 
working harder (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999, Bognanno, 2001) and taking more 
risk (Kini and Williams, 2012) to maximize the outcomes that are used to rank them (Kale et al., 
2009; Burns, Minnick, and Starks, 2017; Phan, Simpson, and Nguyen, 2017).  
Promotion incentives for VPs can relate positively to M&A activities. Graham, Harvey, 
and Puri (2015) conduct a survey of U.S. CEOs about who make important corporate decisions in 
a firm and find that 46.5% of the CEOs in their sample retain the M&A decision making for 
themselves, which implies that the remaining 53.5% of the CEOs may share or delegate acquisition 
 
2 Coles, Li, and Wang (2018) argue that CEO may be motivated by industry tournament incentives. We consider these 
incentives in the robustness check section. 
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decision making authority to the VPs in one way or another. In a recent empirical study, Greene 
and Smith (2018) analyze proxy data and report that CEOs delegate M&A decisions to VPs in 
nearly 30% of the acquisitions in their sample. To the extent that VPs are delegated power to make 
acquisition decisions and tournament-based incentives motivate them to take risk, we expect a 
positive relation between tournament-based incentives and M&A activities proxied by M&A 
likelihood, M&A frequency, and the values of M&A deals. The foregoing discussions lead to our 
first testable hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: CEO pay gap is positively related to M&A activities. 
2.2. CEO pay gap and acquisition performance 
Kale et al. (2009) find a positive relation between CEO pay gap and corporate performance 
proxied by returns on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Phan et al. (2017) report that CEO pay gap 
relates positively to the value of cash to shareholders. Burns et al. (2017) document that CEO pay 
gap is associated with higher firm value in a cross-country sample. Collectively, the findings of 
these studies indicate positive relations between CEO pay gap and acquisition performance of the 
acquiring firms. Following this discussion, we state our second testable hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: CEO pay gap is positively related to the acquisition performance of the acquiring 
firms. 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, tournament incentives may induce VPs to engage 
in overinvestment and excessive risk taking (Hvide, 2002; Glilpatric, 2009). Haß, Müller, and 
Vergauwe (2015) find that excessive risk taking induced by tournament incentives increases the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. As a result, acquisitions motivated by tournament incentives may 
harm shareholder value. These observations lead to our alternative hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2b: CEO pay gap is negatively related to the acquisition performance of the acquiring 
firms. 
Given the possible opposing effects of tournament incentives on the acquisition 
performance of the acquiring firms, their net effect needs to be determined empirically.  
3. Sample, variable construction, and descriptive statistics 
Our sample includes firms in the Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) 
database. The ExecuComp database reports over 80 different compensation items of more than 
12,500 executives (usually top five executive officers of each company) in companies that are 
listed in the Standards and Poor’s (S&P) 500, S&P SmallCap 600, and S&P 400 MidCap indexes. 
The executive compensation data are annual and available from 1992 onwards so our sample starts 
from 1993. The sample ends in 2012 because it allows us to track the long-term performance of 
the acquirers following the deal completion. We obtain accounting data from Compustat, stock 
price and return data from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and M&A data 
from SDC Platinum. To focus the analysis on M&A deals that potentially have visible impacts on 
the respective acquirers, we follow the M&A literature in filtering out those deals with values 
below $5 million and deal ratios, measured as the M&A deal values divided by the acquirer market 
value of equity at the end of the year preceding the M&A deal announcements, below 5% in our 
cross-sectional analyses.3 Furthermore, due to the high level of regulation in the finance and utility 
industries, we exclude acquisitions pursued by firms in these industries from our samples. 
Following previous research (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012; Phan et al., 
2017), we measure CEO pay gap as the difference between the CEO’s total compensation package 
 
3 We relax this value filter in the robustness check section. 
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(ExecuComp variable TDC1, which includes salary, bonus, total value of stock and stock options 
granted, and long-term incentive payouts) and the median total compensation package of the VPs.4 
It is noted that following the adoption of the Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 718 
(formerly FAS 123R) on December 12, 2004, option values reported in ExecuComp change from 
those calculated by the Black-Scholes option pricing model (Black and Scholes, 1973) for 2005 
and earlier period to the fair values self-reported by firms for the post-2005 period. To avoid 
discrepancy in option value calculation over these two periods, we use the dividend-adjusted 
Black-Scholes option pricing model to calculate option values for the post-2005 period. We then 
recalculate the TDC1 variable by substituting the estimated option values for the self-reported ones 
for the post-2005 period and use this measure of TDC1 in our analysis.5 We further identify and 
exclude former CEOs who remain with the firm in an executive position from the median VP 
compensation and pay gap estimation. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the full sample of firms used in the firm 
acquisitiveness analysis and the subsample of firms that pursued M&As in Panels A and B, 
respectively. The full sample is an intersection between Compustat and ExecuComp data that 
includes 19,835 firm-year observations of 2,397 unique firms that have non-missing executive 
compensation data to estimate CEO pay gap from 1993–2012. The M&A subsample, which is the 
intersection between the full sample and M&A data, has 929 unique firms that engaged in 1,816 
M&A deals over the same period. We adjust all variables in dollars for inflation to the beginning 
 
4 Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) use a different measure, CEO pay slice (CPS), to capture pay disparity. 
However, this measure tends to capture a different perspective of executive compensation. We discuss this measure 
in the robustness check section. 
5 Our findings are qualitatively unchanged if we use the TDC1 variable reported in Compustat. 
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of 1993 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The descriptive statistics in Panel A indicate 
that CEO pay gap is large (the mean value is $4.32 million). Since CEO pay gap is heavily skewed 
to the right, we use its natural logarithm transformation in our analysis. Firms on average have five 
VPs. The statistics also suggest that CEO’s equity holdings are highly sensitive to the changes in 
stock price and return volatility (the average CEO delta and CEO vega are approximately $440,290 
and $86,980, respectively). In a majority (54%) of firm-year observations, CEOs are also the 
chairpersons of the boards of directors of their companies. Finally, the average firm in our sample 
is large (with book assets of $5.54 billion) and has high growth potential (the sale growth and 
market-to-book equity are 13% and 1.97, respectively).  
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
The summary statistics in Panel B of Table 1 indicate that firms in the M&A subsample 
are essentially similar to those in the full sample except that the former appear to be smaller, have 
smaller CEO pay gap but larger CEO delta and CEO vega, and experience higher sales growth.6 
When firms engage in M&As, they tend to use cash for payment more frequently (the average 
ratios of cash-only versus stock-only payment are 0.47 vs. 0.10, respectively). 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the inter-temporal and 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
distributions of the M&A deals and acquirers, respectively. During the sample period, the number 
of M&A deals increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s and then declined with the onset of the 
Great Recession. Industries with large numbers of acquiring firms include business services, 
measuring and controlling instruments, photographic medical and optical goods, electronic and 
 
6 There are missing observations for CEO delta and CEO vega, which reduce their number of non-missing observations 
to 1,806. 
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electric equipment and components, chemicals and allied products, industrial and commercial 
machinery and computer equipment, and oil and gas extraction. 
4. Research methods, empirical results, and discussions 
4.1. CEO pay gap and M&A activities 
We employ the following model to examine the relations between CEO pay gap and M&A 
activities: 
M&A activitiesi,t  = α + βLn(Pay gap)i,t-1 + Xi,t-1θ + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects 
+ εi,t                              (1) 
 
In Equation (1), the dependent variable, M&A activities, is either M&A dummy, M&A frequency, 
or acquisition value. M&A dummy takes a value of 1 if a firm announces an M&A bid in year t 
and 0 otherwise. M&A frequency is the number of acquisition deals a firm announces in year t. 
Acquisition value is the total acquisition value of a firm in year t scaled by the firm’s book value 
of assets at the beginning of the year. We use i) the linear probability model to estimate a firm’s 
likelihood to pursue an M&A deal,7 ii) the Poisson model to estimate the number of acquisition 
deals, and iii) the OLS model to estimate the acquisition value of a firm in a given year. 
X is a vector of the control variables. Both CEO pay gap and control variables are measured 
at the end of the preceding fiscal year. Following the M&A literature, we include the following 
variables as controls: Size, Market-to-book ratio, Momentum, Sales growth, Book leverage, and 
Firm age. Previous research suggests that the sensitivities of CEO’s equity holdings to the changes 
in stock price and stock return volatility (i.e., CEO delta and CEO vega, respectively) have impacts 
on corporate risk taking behavior (e.g., Datta et al., 2001; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), 
 
7 Since we control for several types of fixed effects, we use the linear probability model to avoid the incidental 
parameters problem. However, our results are qualitatively similar if we use the probit model for estimation. 
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therefore, we include CEO delta and CEO vega as controls in the regressions. We follow the 
procedures provided in Core and Guay (2002), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), and Kini and 
Williams (2012) in estimating CEO delta and CEO vega. It is possible that CEO pay gap simply 
reflects the bargaining power of the CEOs relative to that of the board of directors, which indicates 
the need to control for CEO bargaining power in the regressions. Previous research suggests that 
an executive who simultaneously serves the dual role of CEO and board chairperson would have 
substantial influence over the board, particularly in setting his own pay (e.g., Cyert, Kang, and 
Kumar, 2002), therefore, we control for CEO bargaining power by including CEO-Chairman dual 
dummy in the regression. Harford (1999) observes a positive relation between corporate excess 
cash and M&A attempts, thus we further control for excess cash in our estimation. εi,t is the error 
term that is assumed to be orthogonal to the variables on the right-hand side of Equation (1) (but 
we relax this assumption in our robustness tests). In addition, we include year dummies to control 
for potential time-varying macroeconomic conditions and 2-digit SIC code industry dummies to 
control for industry-fixed effects. In some specifications, we control for firm fixed effects instead 
of industry fixed effects to capture the effect of within-firm variation of CEO pay gap on firm 
acquisitiveness. Finally, we use the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms to 
make statistical inference. We provide a description of the control variables in the Appendix. 
 We report the estimation results of the M&A linear probability model in Panel A of Table 
3. All columns control for year fixed effects, and Columns 1 and 2 (Columns 3 and 4) control for 
industry (firm) fixed effects. We exclude CEO delta and CEO vega in Columns 1 and 3 but control 
for these two variables in Columns 2 and 4. The coefficients on Ln(Pay gap) are positive, ranging 
from 0.006 to 0.01, and statistically significant across specifications. This result is consistent with 
our expectation of a positive relation between CEO pay gap and M&A likelihood. Turning to the 
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control variables, CEO delta and Market-to-book are positively related to M&A likelihood, while 
CEO vega, Book leverage, and Firm age are negatively related to M&A likelihood.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
When writing executive compensation contracts, boards of directors may anticipate the 
effects of executive compensation on corporate behavior, such as M&As, and incorporate their 
expectation into the contract design. The possibility of a joint determination of executive 
compensation and M&As or reverse causality raises an endogeneity concern, which renders the 
linear probability model coefficient estimates biased and inconsistent. It is ideal if there were 
exogenous shocks to CEO pay gap that we could use to identify its effect on firm acquisitiveness. 
However, executive pay is a firm decision and the literature does not provide a clear guidance on 
any shocks to CEO pay gap that we can exploit for this purpose. Therefore, to alleviate endogeneity 
concern, we employ the instrumental variable (IV) estimation method using the two-stage least 
squares regressions to identify the relation between CEO pay gap and firm acquisitiveness. 
Motivated by prior research (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012; Phan et al., 2017), 
we use the number of VPs as the first instrument for firm pay gap. Intuitively, a larger number of 
VPs implies a lower likelihood of winning the tournament for individual VPs, hence larger 
tournament prize to elicit efforts from these executives.  
We use CEO succession plan dummy as the second instrument for CEO pay gap (Kale et 
al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012). CEO succession plan dummy is an indicator that takes a value 
of 1 if the firm lists its president and/or COO among the VPs and 0 otherwise. When a firm 
designates a VP as a CEO successor, the firm is not likely to run a CEO tournament so the CEO 
pay gap should be smaller. Our selected instruments should be valid because they are directly 
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related to CEO pay gap but arguably indirectly related to firm acquisitiveness through CEO pay 
gap.8  
We report the results of the IV regressions in Panel B of Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 
(Columns 3 and 4) report the first- and second-stage results of the IV regressions that controls for 
industry (firm) fixed effects. The first-stage results reported in Columns 1 and 3 indicate that the 
selected instruments have the expected signs and are statistically significant, suggesting that each 
instrument is relevant by itself. The weak instrument tests indicate that the instruments are strong 
and the overidentification tests suggest that the instruments satisfy the exclusionary requirements. 
The second-stage results reported in Columns 2 and 4 indicate that the coefficients on Instrumented 
Ln(Pay gap) are both positive and significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the linear 
probability model results.9  Furthermore, the Wald test statistic reported in Column 4 rejects 
exogeneity, which substantiates the use of the IV model to address endogeneity concern.10  
Using the coefficient estimates in Panels A and B of Table 3 for calculation, we find that, 
holding other variables unchanged at their sample means, a one standard deviation increase in 
CEO pay gap centered on its sample mean increases the M&A probability, on average, by 8.13 
 
8 In an unreported analysis, we use the 2-digit SIC code industry’s contemporaneous median Ln(Pay gap) as the third 
instrument for firm CEO pay gap (Kale et al., 2009). The intuition is that given an efficient external labor market for 
executives, firm pay gap should be positively correlated with the pay gap of other firms in the same industry. Our 
findings are qualitatively similar; however, we caution that industry CEO pay gap may not pass the instrument validity 
requirement since firms in the same industry may be motivated to set CEO pay gap by the same omitted variable 
(Gormley and Matsa, 2014).  
9 The coefficient estimates of Instrumented Ln(Pay gap) appear to be larger than those in Panel A, which could be due 
to the fact that the IV models identify the local average treatment effect of the endogenous variable on the outcome 
variable (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).  
10 Our findings persist if we also endogenize CEO delta and CEO vega. 
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percentage points. Given the unconditional probability of M&A of 29%, the economic effect of 
pay gap on M&A probability is economically important.  
To the extent that tournament-based incentives lead to superior acquisition performance, 
which in turn improves the promotion opportunities of senior managers, we predict a positive 
relation between acquisition performance and the likelihood of the CEO being promoted from 
inside the acquiring firm.11  To explore this possibility, we run a probit regression with the 
dependent variable being CEO inside promotion dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the CEO is 
promoted from inside the acquiring firm within the next three years following an acquisition deal 
and 0 otherwise. Acquisition performance is proxied by the 3-day acquirer CAR centered on the 
acquisition announcement day. We use the market model to estimate the M&A announcement 
CARs. Consistent with our expectation, the result reported in Column 1 of Table 4 indicates a 
positive relation between acquirer abnormal stock returns and the likelihood of CEO being 
promoted from inside the firm. The result reported in Column 2 of Table 4 suggests that the 
likelihood of CEO inside promotion within the next five years following the acquisition 
completion is even stronger. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that, all else being equal, cash payment is riskier than 
stock payment for an acquirer because the risk of the deal will be borne by the acquirer. To further 
examine the relation between CEO pay gap and acquisition risk, we estimate a cash payment Tobit 
model with the dependent variable being the percentage of cash used for payment to the target in 
 
11 It is worth noting that poor acquisition performance can lead to forced CEO turnover (Lehn and Zhao, 2006); 
however, good acquisition performance can facilitate CEOs’ movement up the industry ladder to other bigger and 
more prestigious companies, which creates promotion incentives for VPs. 
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an acquisition deal. The results reported in Table A1 in the Internet Appendix indicate a positive 
relation between Ln(Pay gap) and the percentage of cash payment, which further corroborates our 
finding of a positive relation between CEO pay gap and corporate risk taking.  
In summary, our results in this section support Hypothesis 1 that CEO pay gap is positively 
related to M&A activities. Moreover, superior acquisition performance increases the promotion 
opportunities for senior managers. 
4.2. CEO pay gap and acquisition performance  
4.2.1. CEO pay gap and acquisition announcement abnormal stock returns 
In the preceding section, we show that tournament incentives, which are proxied by CEO 
pay gap, relate positively to firm acquisition likelihood, and acquisition performance is positively 
related to the promotion opportunities of the VPs. In this section, we examine the direct relation 
between tournament incentives and acquirer stock performance around the deal announcements.  
We run cross-sectional regressions with the dependent variable being the 3-day acquirer 
CAR centered on the bid announcement day (CAR(-1, 1)). The test variable is Ln(Pay gap), which 
is measured at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement. Following the M&A 
literature, we control for acquiring firms’ characteristics that include firm size, market-to-book 
ratio, momentum, book leverage, excess cash, and target and deal characteristics that include deal 
ratio, industry diversification, target public status, payment consideration (i.e., payment is in cash 
only, stock only, or a mixture of cash and stock), and whether the M&A bid is challenged, hostile, 
and made through tender. In addition, we control for the target industry’s M&A intensity and year 
fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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The cross-sectional regression results reported in Column 1 of Table 5 indicate that CEO 
pay gap is positively related to acquirer abnormal stock returns (the coefficient is 0.002 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level). The signs and significance of other control variables are 
also consistent with those documented in the literature. For example, acquirer CARs are negatively 
related to acquirer size, acquirer pre-acquisition stock returns, public target, and target’s high-tech 
status, but positively related to cash payment and financial leverage. We further control for CEO 
delta and CEO vega in Column 2 and note that our finding is virtually unchanged. On the other 
hand, CEO vega is negatively related to acquirer CARs. In Column 3, we control for other 
corporate governance measures proxied by blockholder ownership and the number of anti-takeover 
provisions that a firm adopts, but our findings continue to hold. In Columns 4-6, we re-estimate 
the models similar to those in Columns 1-3 but use the Large CEO pay gap dummy variable, which 
takes a value of 1 if CEO pay gap is above the sample median and 0 otherwise, instead of its 
continuous version to better capture the effect of CEO pay gap. We find that the results are stronger 
with the dummy version of CEO pay gap. 
For illustration, we estimate the economic impact of CEO pay gap on acquirer short-term 
stock performance using the point estimates in Column 1 of Table 5. We find that, holding other 
variables unchanged at their sample means, an increase in CEO pay gap from 0.5 standard 
deviation below to 0.5 standard deviation above the sample mean (i.e., a one standard deviation 
change centered on the sample mean) is associated with an increase of 55 basis points (0.55%) in 
acquirer CAR(-1, 1). Given that the average market value of equity of the sample acquirers is 
$5.335 billion, the increase in acquirer shareholder value is equivalent to $29.17 million. 
Since a firm is more likely to run a CEO tournament if the CEO is near retirement, we sort 
firms into a High (Low) tournament likelihood subsample if their CEOs age 63 or above (below 
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63). We perform the cross-sectional subsample analysis of acquisition announcement stock returns 
and report the results in Table 6. The results indicate that the effects of CEO pay gap on acquirer 
shareholder value are more pronounced for the subsample of firms that are more likely to run CEO 
tournament, which is consistent with the CEO tournament explanations.12 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.2.2. CEO pay gap and acquirer long-term stock and operating performance 
In this section, we examine the relations between CEO pay gap and the acquiring firms’ 
long-term stock and operating performance. An acquirer’s long-term stock performance is proxied 
by its buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), which are calculated as follows:  
  𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅௜ ൌ Π௧ୀଵ் ൫1 ൅ 𝑅௜,௧൯ െ Π௧ୀଵ் ൫1 ൅ 𝑅௠௔௧௖௛௘ௗ ௙௜௥௠,௧൯          (2) 
where BHARi is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of firm i. We estimate the BHARs over the 1-, 
2-, and 3-year periods starting 10 days after the M&A completion based on the matched firm-
adjusted method suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). In 
particular, we calculate the percentage differences in size (proxied by the market value of equity), 
book-to-market ratio, and stock performance (proxied by the buy-and-hold returns) between a 
sample firm and other firms in the same 2-digit SIC code industry in the year preceding the M&A 
announcement. We exclude firms that were involved in M&As in the three-year period before a 
sample firm’s M&A bid announcement from the pool of potential matched firms. For each sample 
 
12 In an unreported analysis, we investigate and find a positive relation between CEO pay gap and the likelihood of 
focused acquisition, which indicates risk-increasing behavior, for firms that are more likely to run tournament. 
However, such relation is negative for firms that are less likely to run CEO tournament.  
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firm, we select a matched firm that has the lowest sum of the absolute value of the estimated 
percentage differences.13 
Operating performance is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, and 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to book value of assets. We follow the method suggested 
by Barber and Lyon (1996) in forming a matched portfolio for each sample firm in the year 
preceding the M&A bid announcement. The matched portfolio includes firms that are in the same 
2-digit SIC code industry as the sample firm, have not been involved in any M&A over the last 
three years, and have operating performance within the range of 90%-110% of the respective 
performance of the sample firm in the year preceding the M&A announcement. We adjust a sample 
firm’s operating performance by the matched portfolio’s contemporaneous median operating 
performance and compare the matched portfolio-adjusted operating performance of the acquirers 
in each of the three years after the M&A completion to that in the year preceding the M&A bid 
announcement. 
Table 7 reports the BHAR regression results. The dependent variables are the 1-, 2-, and 
3-year acquirer BHARs. The estimation results indicate that pre-acquisition CEO pay gap is 
generally significantly positively related to BHARs. Turning to the control variables, the 
coefficient on CEO-Chairman Dummy (Momentum) is positive (negative) and statistically 
significant.  
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
13 Alternatively, we select a matched firm as the one that has size, proxied by the market value of equity in the year 
preceding the M&A bid, in the range of 70%-130% of that of the sample firm, and has the book-to-market ratio closest 
to the sample firm’s one in the year preceding an M&A. Our results are robust to this alternative method of selecting 
the matched firm. 
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Table 8 reports the operating performance regression results. The dependent variables are 
the change in control firm-adjusted operating performance in the first, second, and third year after 
an M&A deal completion relative to that in the year preceding the deal announcement. Overall, 
the coefficients on the pre-acquisition CEO pay gap are positive and marginally significant. 
Among the control variables, Book leverage (Deal ratio) loads positive (negative) and 
significant.14 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
In short, our evidence demonstrates that CEO pay gap is positively related to acquirer long-
term stock and operating performance post mergers, which supports Hypothesis 2a but not 
Hypothesis 2b.  
It is worth noting that although tournament incentives imply that only one senior executive 
can win the tournament prize, which is the increase in pay and prestige associated with the CEO 
position, senior executives may receive “invisible promotion” represented by larger pay packages 
as a result of the acquisition success and more prestige from a larger merged firm even without a 
change in their job titles.15 Furthermore, to the extent that an acquiring firm keeps the target firm 
as a separate entity, like a subsidiary, M&As can also provide additional promotion opportunities 
for acquirer VPs since the acquiring firm may appoint one of its VPs to the CEO position of the 
 
14 CEO pay gap may change dynamically over the relatively long period from pre- to post-acquisition. In an unreported 
analysis, we use either an acquirer’s change in Ln(Pay gap) or its industry-adjusted change in Ln(Pay gap) as the test 
variable in the long-term abnormal operating performance and BHAR regressions. We find positive and highly 
significant relations between the change in Ln(Pay gap) and long-term operating and stock performance. 
15 In a univariate analysis, we find that, on average, the acquirer’s industry-adjusted median VP pay increased by 
approximately $273,000, $374,000, and $331,000 in the first, second, and third year after an M&A deal completion 
relative to its value in the year preceding the M&A deal. 
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target firm. These potential benefits may also elicit greater efforts from senior executives that 
contribute to superior acquirer performance. However, we acknowledge that we cannot completely 
rule out some possible effects of team efforts since acquisition success may require efforts of the 
whole management team. 
5. Robustness Checks 
We conduct a battery of robustness checks and summarize the findings in this section 
(some of the results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors).  
We estimate the acquisition frequency Poisson regression model and acquisition value OLS 
model and report the results in Panels A and B, respectively, of Table A2 in the Internet Appendix. 
We find that CEO pay gap is positively related to both acquisition frequency and value. This result 
is consistent with our finding that CEO pay gap is positively related to firm acquisitiveness. 
It is noted that firms self-select to engage in M&A bids, so our M&A subsample is not 
random. To alleviate any concern about potential self-selection bias, we use the Heckman (1979) 
two-step self-selection correction model. Specifically, in the first step, we run a probit model (with 
specification similar to that of the linear probit model) to estimate the likelihood that a firm engages 
in an M&A bid in a given year. Then we use the probit model’s coefficient estimates to calculate 
the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) as follows: 
     If M&A dummyi,t = 1, then IMRi,t ൌ ఝሺ௑ఉሻఃሺ௑ఉሻ               (3) 
    If M&A dummyi,t = 0, then IMRi,t ൌ ିఝሺ௑ఉሻሺଵିఃሺ௑ఉሻሻ         (4) 
where φ is the probability density function, Φ is the cumulative density function, and β is a vector 
of parameter estimates from the Probit model. We augment the cross-sectional regressions with 
IMR in the second step. If the coefficient on IMR is significant, we can claim that self-selection 
has a significant effect on the second-step estimates of the cross-sectional regression and 
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controlling for self-selection bias is then valid (see Wooldridge, 2002 (pp. 564)). The unreported 
estimation results indicate that our findings are qualitatively unchanged, while the coefficients on 
IMR are statistically insignificant. The latter result suggests that our concern about self-selection 
bias is unsubstantiated. 
Following previous research (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012), we use the 
number of VPs listed in ExecuComp in the main analysis. To alleviate any concern that the number 
of VPs could be arbitrarily cut off in ExecuComp due to the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) reporting rules, we use the number of VPs listed in Boardex to rerun our analysis. We find 
that our results continue to hold.  
Graham et al. (2015) report that shorter tenured CEOs are more likely to delegate authority 
to make decisions to VPs. Therefore, we examine the relation between CEO pay gap and firm 
acquisitiveness and acquisition performance conditional on CEO tenure. The results reported in 
Table A3 in the Internet Appendix indicate that tournament incentives have a stronger positive 
effect for firms with shorter tenured CEOs. Moreover, the CAR regressions indicate that 
tournament incentives also have a more pronounced effect on the acquisition performance of the 
acquiring firms whose CEOs have shorter tenure. 
CEOs of firms with more divisions are also more likely to delegate power to VPs (Graham 
et al., 2015), which suggests that tournament incentives have stronger effects for firms with more 
divisions. To test this prediction, we obtain the number of business segments that a firm has from 
the Compustat Segment database and examine the effects of tournament incentives on M&A 
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likelihood and acquirer firm CAR conditional on its number of business segments. The results 
reported in Table A4 in the Internet Appendix are consistent with our expectation.16 
Some acquirers in our sample were engaged in more than one M&A deal over the sample 
period. To address a possibility that our results are driven by serial M&As pursued by these 
acquirers, we retain the first M&A deal of each acquiring firm in each year during the sample 
period but is not preceded by any M&A deal in the previous three years and rerun our tests. Our 
findings are qualitatively similar even though the sample is smaller. 
To focus on acquisition deals that potentially have significant impacts on the acquirers, we 
filter out those deals that have values below $5 million and account for less than 5% of the acquirer 
market value of equity from our cross-sectional analysis. However, one might be concerned that 
large deals are more likely to be overseen by CEOs and less likely to be delegated to VPs, which 
potentially bias our sample against the tournament incentives. To address this concern, we relax 
the filter and exclude only acquisition deals that have values below 1% of the acquirer market 
value of equity, or even drop this value filter completely, but our findings are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that large CEO pay packages may indicate that 
CEOs capture the pay setting process, which signals agency problems. Bebchuk, Cremers, and 
Peyer (2011) report that CEO pay slice (CPS), which is measured as the fraction of the aggregate 
compensation of the top-five management team captured by the CEO, is negatively related to 
acquirer stock performance. These authors suggest that CPS reflects the importance of the CEO 
and his ability to extract rents, an indication of the agency problems. It is noteworthy that agency 
 
16  We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggestion to consider the effects of tournament incentives on M&As 
conditional on CEO tenure and a firm’s number of divisions.  
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problems are typically associated with lower acquirer performance (Masulis et al., 2007), which is 
inconsistent with our finding of a positive relation between CEO pay gap and acquirer 
performance. CEO pay gap, which measures the dollar difference between a CEO pay package 
and the median pay of the VPs, is different from CPS, which measures CEO pay as the fraction of 
the aggregate compensation of the management team. For our sample, the coefficient of the 
correlation between CEO pay gap and CPS is merely 0.27, suggesting that these two measures 
capture different perspectives of executive compensation. By construction, CPS could bias toward 
firms with smaller size whose management teams tend to have smaller pay packages, thus, a larger 
CPS is likely to indicate CEO relative power. On the other hand, CEO pay gap, as a dollar measure, 
can better capture the prize of the CEO tournament as suggested by the literature. 
Although an intra-firm tournament provides promotion incentives to only VPs, Coles et al. 
(2018) argue that industry promotion incentives can motivate CEOs to take risk and improve 
corporate performance. Huang, Jain, and Kini (2019) report that industry promotion incentives 
motivate firms to deploy cash for investment and focused acquisitions, among others. In the next 
robustness check, we rerun the M&A linear probability and CAR cross-section regressions that 
control for industry promotion incentives proxied by industry pay gap. We follow Coles et al. in 
calculating two measures of the industry pay gap, indgap1 and indgap2, and use them as proxies 
for industry promotion incentives. As the total compensation received by a CEO in a given year 
could be an outlier, indgap1 is measured as the difference between a firm’s CEO total 
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compensation and the second-highest CEO total compensation in the same 2-digit SIC code 
industry group.17  
Since firms typically use CEO pay of industry peers with similar size as a benchmark for 
their own CEO pay (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008; Faulkender and Yang, 2010; Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Nguyen, 2011; Coles et al., 2018), we construct indgap2 based on both 2-digit SIC 
code industry and size grouping. Specifically, in each industry-year, we sort firms into two 
subgroups based on their net sales relative to the industry median net sales and then measure 
industry pay gap as the difference between a firm’s CEO total compensation and the highest CEO 
total compensation in the same industry-size group. Since the findings are qualitatively similar for 
both industry pay gap measures, we report the estimation results based on indgap2 in Table 9 for 
discussion. The estimation results indicate that our findings about the effects of CEO pay gap on 
firm acquisitiveness and acquirer abnormal stock returns are essentially unchanged. Furthermore, 
we note that industry pay gap is negatively related to acquirer abnormal stock returns.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Finally, our sample period includes the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, 
which has effects on executive compensation and corporate governance. To alleviate any concern 
that our results could be affected by SOX, we construct the SOX dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 for the years 2002 and after and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate the M&A probability and CAR 
regression models augmented with the stand-alone SOX dummy variable and its interaction with 
CEO pay gap. The results indicate firms with larger CEO pay gap are more likely to pursue M&As 
 
17 However, we also construct the variable indgap1_raw, which is measured as the difference between a firm’s CEO 
total compensation and the highest CEO total compensation in the same two-digit SIC industry group and use this 
variable in our tests but our findings are qualitatively unchanged. 
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following SOX, which could be explained by stricter due diligence requirements for a greater 
involvement of the VPs in the acquisition process. The CAR regressions indicate that both 
tournament incentives and SOX have a positive effect on acquisition performance; however, the 
interaction between these two variables has little effect on acquirer shareholder value. In an 
alternative analysis, we split the sample into pre- and post-SOX periods and perform subsample 
analysis, but the results are qualitatively similar, albeit weaker due to smaller subsample size. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We use the M&A setting to investigate the links between tournament-based incentives 
proxied by CEO pay gap and firm acquisition activities and acquisition performance. A desirable 
feature of M&As for our research is that M&A decisions are observed at their announcements. 
This feature enables us to capture the relations between CEO pay gap and corporate behavior and 
value and make inference about the incentives of managers. We find positive relations between 
acquirer CEO pay gap and M&A activities and acquirer stock and operating performance. We 
further find that the relation between CEO pay gap and acquisition performance is stronger for 
firms that are more likely to run CEO tournaments. Acquisition performance also relates positively 
to the likelihood of a CEO being promoted from inside the acquiring firm and negatively relates 
to VP turnover. Our results indicate that tournament-based incentives, proxied by CEO pay gap, 
motivate managers to work harder and take more risk that improve acquirer acquisition 
performance. Our evidence suggests that a large pay gap between a CEO and the next group of 
senior executives can induce managers to work harder and pursue risk-increasing policies that 
create greater shareholder value.  
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The on-going debate on executive compensation suggests that large pay disparities among 
firm executives could represent economic rent extraction by powerful CEOs or reflect executive 
compensation incentives. Our results are consistent with the latter, which indicates efficient 
contracting. Our findings suggest that when firms design executive compensation contracts, they 
should consider CEO pay gap as promotion incentives to align the interests of senior managers 
and shareholders. Finally, our evidence suggests that regulators should be careful in formulating 
public policies that arbitrarily push for smaller pay disparities because they may adversely affect 
promotion incentives, an efficient form of contracting, for corporate managers. 
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Appendix. Definitions of Variables 
This appendix provides information on the terms used in this article, along with their definitions 
and the sources from which they were obtained. 
 




The annual geometric mean returns based on CRSP 
monthly stock returns for a fiscal year. 
CRSP 
Book leverage The ratio of the sum of (short-term debt + long-term debt) 
to the book value of assets. 
 
Compustat 
Cash ratio The ratio of cash and equivalents to the book value of 
assets at the beginning of the year.  
Compustat 
CEO age Age of the CEO.  ExecuComp 
CEO delta A measure of the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s 






CEO pay gap The difference between the CEO’s total compensation 




CEO vega A measure of the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s 
equity holdings to a one percent change in the volatility of 






An indicator that takes a value of 1 if competing bid is 
present and 0 otherwise  
SDC Platinum 
Deal ratio M&A deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value 





An indicator that takes a value of 1 if the acquirer and 
target do not belong to the same 2-digit SIC code industry 
and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Excess cash Deviation of firm cash holdings from its expected cash 
holdings where cash holdings are estimated as a function 
of firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, cash flow, 
standard deviation of cash flow for the last ten years, net 
working capital (net of cash), research and development, 
capital expenditures, acquisition spending, dividend, S&P 
long-term credit ratings, and industry and year fixed 
effects.  
Compustat 
Firm age Number of years that a firm has been included in 
Compustat  
Compustat 





An indicator that takes a value of 1 if an acquirer belongs 
to either of the following four-digit SIC industry: 3571, 
3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 
3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 
3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371-7375, 
7378, 7379 and 0 otherwise.  
Compustat 
Hostile dummy An indicator that takes a value of 1 if an M&A is a hostile 
takeover and 0 otherwise.  
SDC Platinum 
M&A dummy An indicator that indicates whether a sample firm 




The market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets where the market value of assets is measured as 
(the market value of equity + preferred stock value + debt 
in current liabilities + long term debt – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit).  
Compustat 
Momentum Momentum is calculated as the buy-and-hold return over 




An indicator that takes a value of 1 if the target in an 
M&A is a publicly listed firm and 0 otherwise.  
SDC Platinum 
Relative size The ratio of acquirer’s to target’s market value of equity 
measured four weeks before bid announcement.  
SDC Platinum 
Sales growth The average annual sale growth rate of the last three years 
 
Compustat 
Size The logarithm transformation of book value of assets.  Compustat 
Target industry 
M&A intensity 
The value of all corporate control transactions of at least 
$1 million reported by SDC Platinum for each prior year 
and 2-digit SIC code industry divided by the total book 
value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same 2-digit 
SIC code industry and year.   
Compustat and 
SDC Platinum 
Tender dummy An indicator that takes a value of 1 if an M&A is 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of an unbalanced panel of 2,397 unique firms that have 
non-missing CEO pay gap from 1993–2012. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of a 
subsample of 929 unique firms that announce M&A bids over the same period. M&A dummy is an 
indicator that takes a value of 1 if a firm announces an M&A bid in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
CEO pay gap is the difference between a CEO’s total pay package and the median pay package of 
the VPs. CEO delta measures the dollar change in the value of CEO’s stockholdings, option 
holdings, and restricted stock and option grants given a 1% change in the stock price. CEO vega 
measures the dollar change in CEO’s option holdings and restricted stock option grants given a 
change of 0.01 in the annualized volatility of stock returns. CEO-chairman dummy takes a value 
of 1 if the CEO is also a Chairman in a given year and 0 otherwise. Market-to-book ratio is 
measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets where the market value 
of assets is measured as (the market value of equity + preferred stock value + debt in current 
liabilities + long term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax credit). Momentum is 12-month 
cumulative return calculated as the annual geometric mean returns based on CRSP monthly stock 
return for each fiscal year. Book leverage is the ratio of the sum of (short term debt + long term 
debt) to the book value of assets. Variables in dollars are inflation-adjusted to the beginning of 
1993 dollars using the CPI. Other variables are as described in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample       
Variable N Mean p25 p50 p75 
Std. 
deviation 
M&A dummy 19,835 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 
CEO pay gap (in thousands) 19,835 4,319.66 604.85 1,538.81 4,136.86 8,097.76 
CEO delta (in thousands) 19,835 440.29 51.53 137.79 376.79 1,006.40 
CEO vega (in thousands) 19,835 86.98 11.07 35.41 95.98 141.34 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 19,835 0.54 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Number of VPs 19,835 4.92 4.00 5.00 6.00 1.31 
Book value of assets (in millions) 19,835 5,543.75 463.76 1,198.09 3,663.96 20,248.92 
Market-to-book ratio 19,835 1.97 1.21 1.56 2.19 1.49 
Book leverage 19,835 0.23 0.06 0.21 0.33 0.21 
Net working capital ratio 19,835 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.17 0.18 
Sales growth 19,835 0.13 -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.79 
Firm age 19,835 25.45 12.00 21.00 38.00 15.89 
 
      
Panel B: M&A Subsample       
Variable N mean p25 p50 p75 
Std. 
deviation 
CAR(-1, 1) 1,816 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.05 
CEO pay gap (in thousands) 1,816 3,583.47 630.67 1,469.01 3,596.54 6,292.63 
CEO delta (in thousands) 1,806 645.67 67.26 148.51 371.21 6,174.44 
CEO vega (in thousands) 1,806 96.67 17.57 39.25 92.56 223.09 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 1,816 0.57 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Number of VPs 1,816 4.99 4.00 5.00 6.00 1.25 
Book value of assets (in millions) 1,816 3,940.06 504.66 1,189.62 2,993.81 11,065.98 
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Market-to-book ratio 1,816 1.92 1.24 1.56 2.07 1.50 
Book leverage 1,816 0.21 0.07 0.21 0.32 0.17 
Sales growth 1,816 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.23 0.73 
Momentum 1,816 0.23 -0.01 0.19 0.43 0.42 
Firm age 1,816 25.73 12.00 22.00 38.00 15.22 
Deal ratio 1,816 0.27 0.08 0.14 0.30 0.36 
Diversifying dummy 1,816 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Cash dummy 1,816 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Stock dummy 1,816 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
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Table 2: Inter-temporal and Industry Distributions of M&As 
Table 2 reports the intertemporal and 2-digit SIC code industries distribution of M&A activities 
of acquirers over the period 1994–2012. 
Panel A: Inter-temporal Distribution of M&As     
  Year   Frequency Percent 
 1994  10 0.55 
 1995  62 3.41 
 1996  113 6.22 
 1997  105 5.78 
 1998  110 6.06 
 1999  99 5.45 
 2000  104 5.73 
 2001  95 5.23 
 2002  96 5.29 
 2003  117 6.44 
 2004  131 7.21 
 2005  104 5.73 
 2006  112 6.17 
 2007  105 5.78 
2008 73 4.02 
2009 65 3.58 
 2010  93 5.12 
 2011  102 5.62 
 2012  120 6.61 
      1,816 100.00 
     
Panel B: 2-digit SIC Code Industries with Most M&A Deals  
2-digit SIC Code Industry Frequency Percent 
73  Business Services 234 12.89 
38 
 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; 





Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and 




Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 
152 8.37 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products 140 7.71 
13  Oil and Gas Extraction 106 5.84 
37  Transportation Equipment 58 3.19 
80  Health Services 58 3.19 
33  Primary Metal Industries 52 2.86 
20  Food and Kindred Products 48 2.64 
27  Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 44 2.42 
50   Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 41 2.26 
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Table 3: CEO Pay Gap and Firm Acquisitiveness 
Table 3 reports the results of the M&A linear probability (Panel A) and IV regression (Panel B) 
models using the full sample from 1993–2012. The dependent variable is M&A dummy that takes 
a value of 1 if a firm announces an M&A deal in a given year and 0 otherwise. Pay gap is the 
difference between a CEO’s total pay package and the median pay package of the VPs. The 
remaining variables are controls and are defined in the Appendix. The models are estimated with 
year fixed effects and either 2-digit SIC code industry or firm fixed effects, but their estimates are 
suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Linear Probability Models 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Ln(Pay gap) 0.008*** 0.006*  0.010*** 0.010** 
 (2.79) (1.70)  (3.10) (2.55) 
Ln(CEO delta)  0.012***   0.009** 
  (3.83)   (2.11) 
Ln(CEO vega)  -0.011***   -0.007* 
  (3.33)   (1.72) 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy -0.006 -0.01 0.004 0.001 
(0.92) (1.41) (0.48) (0.12) 
Book leverage -0.112*** -0.120*** -0.241*** -0.266*** 
 (8.17) (8.21)  (9.47) (9.78) 
Excess cash -0.007 -0.007  0.016** 0.019*** 
 (1.58) (1.46)  (2.56) (3.02) 
Market-to-book 0.021*** 0.019***  0.017*** 0.014*** 
 (8.49) (7.02)  (4.74) (3.62) 
Net working capital ratio 0.080*** 0.077***  0.026 0.058 
 (4.24) (3.37)  (0.90) (1.57) 
Sale growth 0.005 0.006  0.003 0.004 
 (1.39) (1.25)  (1.17) (1.43) 
Size 0.057*** 0.059***  -0.006 -0.007 
 (21.20) (18.20)  (0.84) (0.78) 
Ln(firm age) -0.014*** -0.008  -0.037** -0.049** 
 (2.83) (1.47)  (1.99) (2.38) 
Intercept -0.117*** -0.129***  0.082 0.116 
 (3.01) (4.40)  (1.01) (1.28) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  No No 
Firm fixed effects No No  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 19,835 19,416  19,835 19,416 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08   0.25 0.25 
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Panel B: IV Regressions      
  First-stage Second-stage   First-stage Second-stage 
  (1) (2)   3 4 
Number of VPs 0.023***   0.010**  
 (4.13)   (2.01)  
CEO succession plan dummy -0.118***   -0.040***  
 (8.49)   (2.60)  
Instrumented Ln(Pay gap)  0.054**   0.108** 
  (1.97)   (1.99) 
Ln(CEO delta) 0.284*** -0.006  0.336*** -0.021 
 (47.72) (0.42)  (45.31) (0.83) 
Ln(CEO vega) 0.009*** -0.001  0.004*** -0.001 
 (8.58) (1.33)  (4.19) (1.51) 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 0.114*** -0.014*  -0.004 -0.008 
 (7.74) (1.67)  (0.22) (0.97) 
Book leverage -0.067* -0.115***  -0.114** -0.159*** 
 (1.84) (6.56)  (2.13) (7.33) 
Excess cash 0.033*** -0.010*  0.007 0.003 
 (2.76) (1.65)  (0.51) (0.52) 
Market-to-book 0.053*** 0.016***  0.024*** 0.014*** 
 (10.22) (4.56)  (3.94) (3.10) 
Net working capital ratio -0.495*** 0.108*** -0.307*** 0.119*** 
(9.43) (3.01) (3.90) (2.88) 
Sale growth -0.015 0.007  -0.020** 0.005 
 (1.58) (1.62)  (2.42) (1.17) 
Size 0.351*** 0.038**  0.387*** 0.004 
 (54.64) (2.10)  (24.02) (0.16) 
Ln(firm age) -0.042*** -0.007  0.048 -0.011 
 (3.84) (1.18)  (1.22) (1.44) 
Intercept 2.712*** -0.254*  2.147*** -0.803** 
 (44.00) (1.81)  (14.22) (2.21) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  No No 
Firm fixed effects No No  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 19,416 19,416  19,416 19,416 
Adjusted R2 0.58   0.71  
      
Wald test of exogeneity:      
F-statistic  1.08   3.47 
p-value  0.30   0.06 
      
Sargan overidentification test:      
χ2 2.41   0.23  
p-value 0.12   0.63  
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Weak instrument test:      
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Table 4: Acquirer Performance and CEO Inside Promotion 
Table 4 reports the results of the CEO inside promotion probit model. The dependent variable is 
CEO inside promotion dummy that takes a value of 1 if an acquiring firm’s CEO is promoted from 
inside the company within three years (or five years) following an acquisition deal and 0 otherwise. 
CAR(-1, 1) is the 3-day acquirer CAR centered on the acquisition announcement day. Change in 
operating performance is the change in acquirer operating performance from before to after the 
acquisition deal. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
  
Next 3 years CEO 
Inside Promotion 
Next 5 years CEO 
Inside Promotion 
  (1) (2) 
CAR(-1, 1) 0.648** 1.713** 
 (1.95) (2.04) 
Size 0.069** 0.054 
 (2.26) (1.57) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.039 0.034 
 (1.57) (1.32) 
Book leverage -0.247 -0.037 
(0.99) (0.13) 
Change in operating performance 0.547 -0.181 
 (0.96) (0.28) 
Intercept -0.643 -0.204 
 (1.35) (0.54) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,142 866 
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Table 5: Acquirer CAR Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Table 5 reports the cross-sectional regression results of the acquirer CARs. The dependent variable 
is the 3-day acquirer CAR centered on the acquisition announcement days. Pay gap is the 
difference between a CEO’s total pay package and the median pay package of the VPs. Large CEO 
pay gap dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s CEO pay gap is above 
the sample median and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are controls and are defined in the 
Appendix. Firm characteristics are measured at the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Pay gap) 0.002** 0.002** 0.003*    
 (2.03) (1.99) (1.75)    
Large CEO pay gap dummy    0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 
    (3.50) (3.57) (3.27) 
Ln(CEO delta)  0.002* 0.002  0.002 0.002 
  (1.67) (1.48)  (1.61) (1.39) 
Ln(CEO vega)  -0.001** -0.001  -0.001** -0.002 
(2.22) (0.76) (2.46) (1.17) 
GIM index -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.34)   (0.32) 
Blockholder ownership   -0.01   -0.01 
   (0.75)   (0.82) 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.34) (0.23) (0.30) (0.37) (0.29) (0.21) 
Size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (4.07) (4.08) (3.42) (4.66) (4.42) (3.77) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.23) (1.49) (0.98) (1.26) (1.48) (0.94) 
Book leverage 0.017** 0.017** 0.019* 0.017** 0.017** 0.020* 
 (2.43) (2.46) (1.79) (2.50) (2.54) (1.92) 
Deal ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.35) (0.16) (0.94) (0.37) (0.18) (0.91) 
Diversifying dummy -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (1.30) (1.42) (0.48) (1.35) (1.48) (0.53) 
Target public status dummy -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (6.66) (6.55) (4.42) (6.63) (6.50) (4.44) 
Challenge dummy -0.01 -0.01 -0.003 -0.01 -0.01 -0.003 
 (1.33) (1.33) (0.35) (1.28) (1.27) (0.29) 
Hostile dummy 0.022* 0.022** 0.027* 0.022* 0.022* 0.027* 
 (1.83) (1.99) (1.92) (1.80) (1.94) (1.92) 
Cash dummy 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007** 
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 (3.09) (3.31) (2.18) (3.08) (3.31) (2.28) 
Stock dummy -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 (1.31) (1.21) (0.66) (1.26) (1.14) (0.51) 
Momentum -0.005* -0.005* -0.009** -0.005* -0.005* -0.009** 
 (1.87) (1.68) (2.03) (1.84) (1.66) (1.99) 
Excess cash -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (1.21) (1.22) (0.16) (1.29) (1.29) (0.24) 
High tech dummy -0.006** -0.006** -0.008* -0.006** -0.006** -0.008** 
 (2.28) (2.25) (1.94) (2.31) (2.26) (2.06) 
Target's industry M&A intensity -0.017 -0.018 -0.005 -0.018 -0.018 -0.006 
 (1.52) (1.57) (0.37) (1.60) (1.62) (0.41) 
Intercept 0.023*** 0.020** 0.022 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.030** 
 (3.01) (2.43) (1.54) (4.08) (3.42) (2.35) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,816 1,816 839 1,816 1,816 839 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 
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Table 6: CEO Pay Gap and Acquirer CARs – CEO Tournament Likelihood 
Table 6 reports the results of the acquirer CAR cross-sectional regressions for subgroups of firms 
sorted on CEO age, which proxies for a firm’s likelihood of running CEO tournament. The 
dependent variable is the 3-day acquirer CAR centered on the acquisition announcement day. Pay 
gap is the difference between a CEO’s total pay package and the median pay package of the VPs 
and is measured at the end of the year preceding the M&A announcement. Large CEO pay gap 
dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s CEO pay gap is above the sample 
median and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are controls and are defined in the Appendix. t-
statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 





63 or Above 
CEO Age 
Below 63 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Pay gap) 0.002** 0.001*   
 (2.02) (1.72)   
Large CEO pay gap dummy   0.009*** 0.005* 
   (3.40) (1.76) 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 0.007 0.001 0.008 -0.002 
(1.03) (0.13) (1.03) (0.82) 
Size -0.006** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.004*** 
 (2.59) (3.81) (2.27) (4.34) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.49) (0.78) (0.46) (1.10) 
Book leverage 0.029 0.020*** 0.027 0.018** 
 (1.37) (2.76) (1.26) (2.49) 
Deal ratio 0.027*** -0.006* 0.026*** -0.005 
 (3.08) (1.76) (2.93) (1.33) 
Diversifying dummy -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.66) (1.02) (0.79) (0.91) 
Target public status dummy -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.016*** 
 (3.22) (5.14) (3.25) (5.45) 
Challenge dummy -0.043 -0.006 -0.041 -0.005 
 (1.55) (0.68) (1.46) (0.63) 
Hostile dummy 0.052** 0.014 0.049** 0.015 
 (2.40) (0.93) (2.20) (1.12) 
Cash dummy 0.015** 0.005* 0.012** 0.006** 
 (2.58) (1.95) (2.07) (2.41) 
Stock dummy 0.020* -0.006 0.021* -0.006 
 (1.74) (1.28) (1.78) (1.34) 
Momentum -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 
 (1.10) (1.36) (0.86) (1.29) 
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Excess cash -0.006 -0.001 -0.008** -0.001 
 (1.64) (0.05) (2.05) (0.27) 
High tech dummy -0.006 -0.007** -0.007 -0.007** 
 (0.87) (2.50) (1.00) (2.53) 
Target's industry M&A intensity 0.016 -0.022* 0.016 -0.021* 
 (0.56) (1.81) (0.53) (1.71) 
Intercept 0.031 0.040*** 0.028 0.029*** 
 (1.46) (4.07) (1.36) (3.94) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 245 1,509 245 1,509 
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Table 7: CEO Pay Gap and Acquirer Long-term Stock Performance 
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional regression results of the acquirer one-, two-, and three-year 
BHARs. The BHARs are calculated based on the matched firm-adjusted method as described in 
the text. Pay gap is the difference between a CEO’s total pay package and the median pay package 
of the VPs and is measured at the end of the year preceding the M&A announcement. Large CEO 
pay gap dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s CEO pay gap is above 
the sample median and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are controls and are defined in the 
Appendix. The models are estimated with year fixed effects, but their estimates are suppressed for 
brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 












Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Pay gap) -0.004 0.003* 0.014*    
 (0.28) (1.75) (1.83)    
Large CEO pay gap dummy    0.02* 0.072* 0.089** 
    (1.71) (1.81) (1.96) 
Ln(CEO delta) 0.003 -0.009 -0.018 -0.004 -0.019 -0.025 
 (0.23) (0.49) (0.78) (0.35) (1.01) (1.16) 
Ln(CEO vega) -0.009 -0.001 -0.016 -0.009 -0.001 -0.016 
(1.39) (0.02) (1.29) (1.22) (0.09) (1.32) 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 0.027 0.122*** 0.116** 0.02 0.095** 0.085* 
 (1.02) (3.03) (2.35) (0.76) (2.34) (1.70) 
Size 0.009 -0.007 0.01 0.008 -0.006 0.013 
 (0.73) (0.37) (0.42) (0.66) (0.29) (0.54) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.009 0.023 0.034** 0.007 0.021** 0.033** 
 (0.93) (1.64) (1.98) (0.89) (2.02) (2.48) 
Momentum -0.139*** -0.202*** -0.235*** -0.139*** -0.209*** -0.239*** 
 (4.43) (4.29) (4.03) (3.82) (3.82) (3.70) 
Book leverage 0.096 -0.052 -0.148 0.088 -0.09 -0.198 
 (1.12) (0.40) (0.93) (1.01) (0.67) (1.20) 
Deal ratio -0.038 -0.015 0.009 -0.036 -0.014 0.008 
 (1.08) (0.28) (0.13) (1.01) (0.26) (0.11) 
Diversifying dummy -0.002 0.007 0.061 -0.001 0.008 0.061 
 (0.07) (0.18) (1.28) (0.05) (0.20) (1.24) 
Target public status dummy -0.008 -0.009 -0.044 -0.017 -0.031 -0.066 
 (0.26) (0.20) (0.80) (0.61) (0.73) (1.21) 
High tech dummy -0.002 -0.015 0.033 -0.001 -0.014 0.033 
 (0.06) (0.32) (0.59) (0.01)  (0.30) (0.55) 
Intercept -0.094 -0.002 -0.064 -0.063 -0.002 -0.096 
 (0.78) (0.01) (0.29) (0.75) (0.02) (0.62) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 
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Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 8: CEO Pay Gap and Acquirer Long-term Operating Performance 
Table 8 reports the cross-sectional regression results of the acquirer operating performance. The 
dependent variable is the change in acquirer matched portfolio-adjusted operating performance, 
which is measured as the difference between an acquirer’s matched portfolio-adjusted operating 
performance in the first, second, and third year following the M&A deal completion and its 
respective matched portfolio-adjusted operating performance in the year preceding the M&A 
announcement (labeled OP1, OP2, and OP3, respectively). Pay gap is the difference between a 
CEO’s total pay package and the median pay package of the VPs and is measured at the end of the 
year preceding the M&A announcement. Large CEO pay gap dummy is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 if a firm’s CEO pay gap is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The 
remaining variables are controls and are defined in the Appendix. The models are estimated with 
year fixed effects, but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
  OP1 OP2 OP3 OP1 OP2 OP3 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Pay gap) 0.001 0.002* 0.003*    
 (0.72) (1.72) (1.74)    
Large CEO pay gap dummy    0.004* 0.007* 0.009** 
    (1.67) (1.84) (2.34) 
Ln(CEO delta) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.42) (1.19) (1.15) (0.24) (0.30) (0.78) 
Ln(CEO vega) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.75) (0.92) (1.00) (1.06) 
CEO-Chairman dual dummy 0.005 0.008** 0.004 0.004 0.008** 0.006 
 (1.54) (2.11) (1.17) (1.25) (2.09) (1.61) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.83) (0.04) (0.26) (0.43) (0.35) (0.69) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.001 0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.64) (0.61) (1.92) (0.81) (0.20) (1.76) 
Book leverage 0.021** 0.035*** 0.027** 0.018* 0.031*** 0.027** 
 (2.29) (3.06) (2.53) (1.95) (2.79) (2.44) 
Deal ratio -0.018*** -0.011** -0.009 -0.017*** -0.011** -0.009* 
 (3.45) (2.10) (1.59) (3.32) (2.05) (1.65) 
Diversifying dummy 0.005 0.001 0.006* 0.005* 0.002 0.007** 
 (1.54) (0.40) (1.83) (1.68) (0.47) (2.00) 
Target public status dummy 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0 -0.003 
 (0.90) (0.19) (1.05) (0.92) (0.05) (0.70) 
High tech dummy -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.96) (0.36) (1.01) (0.57) (0.30) (1.05) 
Intercept 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.006 -0.002 -0.01 
 (1.57) (0.54) (0.24) (0.65) (0.16) (0.91) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,559 1,376 1,234 1,559 1,376 1,234 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
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Table 9: CEO Pay Gap, Industry Pay gap, and M&As 
Table 9 reports the results of the M&A linear probit models using the full sample from 1993–2012. 
The dependent variable is M&A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm announces an M&A deal 
in a given year and 0 otherwise. Pay gap is the difference between a CEO’s total pay package and 
the median pay package of the VPs. Large CEO pay gap dummy is an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 if a firm’s CEO pay gap is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. Industry pay 
gap is measured as the difference between a firm’s CEO total compensation and the highest CEO 
total compensation in the same industry-size group. Panel B reports the acquirer CAR cross-
sectional regression results. The dependent variable is the 3-day acquirer CAR centered on the 
acquisition announcement day. The models are estimated with other control variables, but their 
estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: CEO Pay Gap, Industry Pay Gap, and M&A Probability 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Pay gap) 0.008*** 0.007* 0.010*** 0.010** 
 (2.83) (1.89) (2.99) (2.37) 
Ln(Industry pay gap) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.008 0.009* 
(3.09) (2.76) (1.48) (1.71) 
Ln(CEO delta) 0.012*** 0.010** 
  (3.82)  (2.25) 
Ln(CEO vega)  -0.011***  -0.008* 
  (3.39)  (1.81) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 19,588 18,074 19,588 18,074 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.24 
     
Panel B: CEO Pay Gap, Industry Pay Gap, and Acquirer CARs 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Pay gap) 0.002* 0.002*   
 (1.68) (1.73)   
Large CEO pay gap dummy   0.007*** 0.008*** 
   (2.88) (3.13) 
Ln(Industry CEO pay gap) -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 (1.82) (1.79) (2.25) (2.30) 
Ln(CEO delta)  0.002  0.001 
  (1.58)  (0.94) 
Ln(CEO vega)  -0.001**  -0.001** 




 (2.26)  (2.52) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,816 1,816 1,816 1,816 
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